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Abstract 
 
This article explores and critically examines the connections between tax and 
development on the one hand and tax and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on the 
other. It does so because while there is increasing recognition of the importance of 
taxation to efforts to resource the state and finance efforts to tackle poverty, there is a 
surprising lack of attention to tax avoidance and evasion as a CSR issue for 
Transnational Corporations operating in the South, even among those companies that 
pride themselves on being CSR leaders. We review evidence of these trends, provide an 
empirical analysis of how leading firms deal with tax in their corporate reporting and 
make the case for including taxation as a new frontier in progressive CSR.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Amid a series of scandals about the widespread use of tax avoidance schemes by leading 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), including the non-payment of corporation tax in the 
UK by household brand names such as Google, Starbucks and Amazon, and parallel 
efforts by the development community to improve the tax raising capacities of states in 
the global south, the issue of corporate responsibility towards taxation has moved centre 
stage. But how serious a problem is it, what strategies do corporations employ to avoid 
paying tax and what can be done about it? What is the normative basis for including the 
‘beyond compliance’ payment of taxes by TNCs to the growing list of other social and 
environmental issues that companies are expected to address as part of their Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR)?  
  
TNCs have come under increasing pressure to enhance the developmental components of 
their CSR strategies when operating in the global south.
2
 Whether around labour rights, 
environmental protection or human rights issues, a range of initiatives have sought to 
harness the power of the private sector to alleviate poverty, either at a general level in the 
form of the Global Compact or the Sullivan Principles, or around specific issues such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Equator Principles on project 
financing. In historical terms this move dovetails with the emphasis within neo-liberalism 
upon the pivotal role of the private sector in development: an ideology promoted by a 
growing range of multilateral development banks and institutions of global economic 
governance and leading states in the international system which sponsor them.
3
 This 
mantle has been taken up by a number of development agencies which actively promote 
CSR as a way in which the private sector can contribute to development goals.
4
 Thus for 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID): “By following socially 
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responsible practices, the growth generated by the private sector will be more inclusive, 
equitable and poverty reducing”.5 Antonio Vives of the Inter-American Development 
Bank similarly writes that “CSR, by its very nature, is development done by the private 
sector, and it perfectly complements the development efforts of governments and 
multilateral development agencies”.6 Some have even gone as far as to trumpet the 
‘fortune at the bottom of the pyramid’ available to those companies that target their 
products and services at the very poorest
7
, in other words those that ‘make poverty 
business’.8   
 
Besides the articulation of a ‘business’ case for addressing poverty, the uptake of CSR 
also responds to a legitimacy crisis provoked by public concern about acts of corporate 
irresponsibility in the global south including the exploitation of lower social or 
environmental standards and acts of negligence by allowing corporate leaders to allay 
demands for further regulation aimed at preventing a ‘race to the bottom’. However 
corporate critics, including a number of development NGOs,
9
 have questioned whether 
CSR is as an appropriate means of promoting development. CSR is often seen as a form 
of public relations (referred to as “greenwash” in relation to environmental issues or blue-
wash when affiliations with the UN are sought through initiatives such as the Global 
Compact) designed to improve the image of companies but having little real development 
impact.
10
 Even well intentioned corporate efforts to promote development can have 
negative impacts because of lack of understanding of local contexts.
11
 The CSR agenda is 
often shaped by pressures from NGOs, trade unions or consumers in the North and as a 
result the issues addressed reflect their concerns rather than the development needs of 
claimed beneficiaries in the global South.
12
 Moreover, many of the negative impacts 
associated with business are a result of corporate strategies which are crucial for the 
profitability of the companies concerned but which are left untouched by CSR, such as 
the ability to rapidly re-locate capital, informal labour contracts, outsourcing and lack of 
trade union recognition.
13
 
 
This paper focuses on one of the issues which have been largely absent from the CSR 
agenda: tax payments and tax avoidance by companies. This is despite a flurry of recent 
scandals engulfing leading corporations that identify themselves as leaders on CSR 
issues. The next section considers in more detail the development of the CSR agenda and 
the limitations of CSR as a means of promoting development in general. The paper then 
turns to the role of taxation in development and the increasing attention given to the need 
for a capable state and the role of taxation in ensuring that the state is able to support the 
private sector.
14
 This is followed by a discussion of the evidence on tax evasion and tax 
avoidance and the impact that this has on government revenues in developing countries.  
It will also provide evidence of the prevalence of such practices amongst major TNCs. A 
case is then made for regarding corporate tax strategies as an integral part of CSR.  
Indeed there are many parallels between tax and mainstream CSR issues such as labour 
rights and environmental sustainability. However, as Section 6 shows where we provide 
an analysis of the leading 35 companies listed on the FTSE4Good, most major companies 
do not currently regard tax as an aspect of CSR. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the requirements of a responsible corporate tax policy and also of the limitations of CSR 
as a means of tackling tax problems. 
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2. CSR and Development 
 
The wave of CSR aimed at pacifying concerns about the ability of TNCs to exploit 
double (lower) standards when operating in the developing countries led to a proliferation 
of corporate codes of conduct and CSR reports as well as a variety of international 
initiatives including those mentioned above. It dates back to the 1990s culminating in the 
establishment of the UN Global Compact in 2000. This followed a period of deregulation 
and increased openness in most developing countries as a result of the structural 
adjustment policies adopted in the 1980s. Growing reliance on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the increased involvement of Northern buyers in global “value chains” led to 
deeper integration between developed and developing countries.
15
 At the same time, the 
increased significance of brands and corporate reputation rendered leading companies 
particularly vulnerable to bad publicity. The developments in global communications 
which enabled corporations to control production activities on an ever-widening scale 
also facilitated the international transmission of information about working conditions at 
overseas suppliers, contributing to increased public awareness and facilitating 
campaigning activities.
16
 
 
Companies often responded to bad publicity surrounding their activities by adopting CSR 
strategies. Many firms sourcing consumer goods from developing countries put in place 
supplier codes of conduct following scandals about the labour practices of their sub-
contractors.
17
 Environmental issues also became a matter of increasing public concern, as 
attention focused on the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992. In the run-up to that Summit, 
the corporate sector resisted suggestions that legally-binding environmental rules should 
be applied to transnational corporations, instead promoting self-regulation through 
voluntary codes and charters.
18
 During the 1990s, major transnational corporations in the 
oil and other extractive industries, such as Shell, BP and Rio Tinto came to be seen as 
leaders in terms of the environmental dimensions of CSR. They also incorporated the 
protection of human rights into their business principles, following the negative publicity 
about Shell’s activities in the Niger Delta and BP’s operations in Colombia in the mid-
1990s.
19
 
 
The emergence of the environmental impacts of business, labour rights and human rights 
as central issues in CSR in recent years largely reflects the particular concerns of NGOs, 
trade unions, consumers and shareholders in the developed world.
20
 Even within these 
broad areas, the particular issues that have attracted most attention are often those which 
appeal to these Northern stakeholders. This is no doubt partly why eliminating child 
labour has been such a focus in relation to labour rights.
21
 Companies are particularly 
concerned with those aspects of their operations which can potentially damage their 
reputation as a result of media exposure. Other issues have been largely absent from the 
CSR agenda up to now, including aspects of corporate behaviour such as abuse of market 
power, transfer pricing and tax avoidance.   
 
One of the main limitations of CSR is the way in which corporate practices that are 
central to company profitability are not considered part of a company’s corporate 
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responsibility.  One example of this is the purchasing practices of buyers in garment and 
horticulture supply chains where rapid response and tight delivery schedules are the 
rule.
22
 This often leads to long hours of work, compulsory overtime and the cancellation 
of rest days, which go against the companies’ aspirations to social responsibility as set 
out in their codes of conduct. Since these practices are seen as crucial for 
competitiveness, they are allowed to continue while CSR initiatives focus on issues such 
as avoiding employment of under-age workers which in situations where there is an 
ample supply of labour, does not pose such a problem. 
 
One issue which has not, so far, featured prominently on the CSR and development 
agenda is taxation.  Although issues of corporate tax avoidance have come to the fore in 
the North during the global financial crisis and some development NGOs have raised the 
issue of tax avoidance by transnational corporations (TNCs) in developing countries
23
 as 
will be shown below, it has barely been touched upon in the discussion of CSR in 
developing countries. 
 
3. Tax and Development 
 
The space that has been opened up, post-Washington Consensus, for the re-evaluation of 
the role of the state in development has enabled a focus on issues of governance and the 
need for an effective state. This has led to an emphasis on the need for adequate finance 
and more specifically to a focus on taxation and development.
24
 The UN International 
Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 
emphasized the need to enhance the revenue-raising capacities of developing countries as 
a crucial factor in advancing sustainable development. More recently, a joint meeting of 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
stated that “a strong tax system is at the heart of a country’s financial independence, its 
revenues are the lifeblood of the state itself”.25 
 
At the same time, globalisation has made it increasingly difficult for states to obtain tax 
revenues. The increased mobility of capital and spread of global operations of major 
companies has opened up new possibilities for both tax avoidance and evasion. The vast 
sums being channelled through tax havens offer a clear indication of the problems faced 
by governments in protecting their revenue base.
26
 Moreover, increased competition 
between countries to attract FDI leads to more generous incentives and tax breaks being 
offered to multinationals. It is not surprising in this context that many states face large 
and growing fiscal deficits. 
 
This is a particular problem for developing countries. First, they tend to rely more heavily 
on corporate taxes than developed countries. The average share of corporate taxes in total 
tax revenue between 1990 and 2001 was 17% as opposed to 7%.
27
 Second, corporate tax 
revenue declined more rapidly in developing counties. There is a real danger that 
developing countries get caught in a vicious circle. Declining tax revenues weakens the 
state just as it is increasingly recognised that development, even if led by the private 
sector, requires an efficient and well financed state.  The weakening of the state in turn 
makes it less able to take the steps necessary in order to strengthen its fiscal position. Is 
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there an alternative which will make it possible for developing countries to rebuild their 
fiscal position? 
 
4. Corporate Tax Strategies and Government Revenue 
 
While the need for tax revenue is widely recognised, the ability of governments to raise 
taxes in developing countries is limited.  On average tax revenues accounted for 35% of 
GDP in developed countries, but only 15% in developing countries and 12% in low 
income countries in 2005.
28
 Low tax revenues are partly a reflection of the extent of the 
informal sector which it is difficult by its very nature to tax (the domestic component) 
and partly a result of tax evasion and tax avoidance by corporations in the formal sector 
and wealthy individuals who are able to shift profits and hold assets overseas. It is this 
latter international component and particularly that associated with the activities of 
transnational corporations that are of interest in this paper. 
 
In a world where capital is increasingly mobile and globally organised, whereas taxes are 
raised at a national level, the opportunities that companies have to reduce their tax 
payments are many. Indeed some of the changes in the global economy which were seen 
above to have contributed to increased pressures on companies to adopt CSR, have also 
made it easier for them to reduce their tax liabilities. The growing importance of 
intangible assets such as brands as a source of profit has made it possible for companies 
to locate assets in low tax areas without having to establish a significant physical 
presence, as a result of what Palan refers to as the ‘commercialisation of sovereignty’.29  
The speed and low cost of global communications has also facilitated the dispersal of 
corporate assets around the world to take advantage of tax differentials. This has been 
accompanied by a change in the attitude of corporations towards tax compliance over the 
past couple of decades where it has come to be seen by some as discretionary rather than 
obligatory and the growth of the “tax shelter” industry actively promoted by major 
accountancy firms.
30
 The large numbers of tax havens around the world and the volume 
of transactions that pass through them, is perhaps the most striking illustration of the 
importance both companies and wealthy individuals attach to reducing their tax bills.
31
 
 
Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax compliance 
 
A distinction is usually made between tax evasion which is illegal and tax avoidance 
which is not. Tax evasion involves deliberate deception of the tax authorities through, for 
example, not declaring income for tax purposes, false accounting or false invoicing on 
traded goods. Tax avoidance on the other hand refers to measures to minimize a tax bill 
while complying with the letter of the law. This can be achieved through a variety of 
complex pricing and financial transactions and corporate structures. The distinction is not 
as clear cut as might appear though since an arrangement that a company considers legal 
may, if challenged in court by the tax authorities, be found to be illegal. Indeed HMRC’s 
Anti-Avoidance Group states that “It is impossible to provide a comprehensive definition 
of (tax) avoidance”.32 
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A distinction is also drawn between tax avoidance and tax planning. Since tax incentives 
are often provided by governments to induce certain types of behaviour by companies, 
responding to such incentives is not regarded as tax avoidance, although it reduces the 
company’s tax payments. Again this distinction is not clear cut. HMRC indicates that: 
 
“Fine distinctions between ‘tax planning’ and ‘tax avoidance’ are seen as being of less 
consequence than the overall effect on the yield to the Exchequer”.33 
 
The Tax Justice Network provides the following definition of tax avoidance: 
 
“Aggressive tax avoidance is the practice of seeking to minimise a tax bill by attempting 
to comply with the letter of the law whilst avoiding its purpose or spirit.  It usually entails 
setting up artificial transactions or entities to re-characterise the nature, recipient or 
timing of payments”.34 
 
A similar definition which again emphasises the artificial nature of transactions is 
provided by The Guardian newspaper which describes tax avoidance as: 
 
“Artificial schemes that try to take advantage of loopholes or lack of clarity in the law to 
reduce a company’s tax bill, or deliberate structuring of ownership of assets (particularly 
in relation to location) to reduce tax”.35   
 
Some authors present corporate tax strategies as a continuum which goes from tax 
evasion through more or less “aggressive” tax avoidance to tax compliance. Such an 
approach has the advantage of avoiding hard and fast distinctions which, as pointed out 
above, are sometimes difficult to make. 
 
Estimates of tax avoidance in developing countries 
 
By its very nature, the extent of tax evasion and tax avoidance is very difficult to 
measure. Although there are some official figures for the “tax gap” in developed 
countries, most of the estimates that have been made for developing countries come from 
NGOs. 
 
Table 1 shows a number of estimates of the total amount of tax lost by developing 
countries which have been widely quoted. A variety of different approaches have been 
used to arrive at these figures. Most studies of illicit capital flows and the associated loss 
of tax revenues are based either on analysis of trade data to try to identify mispricing of 
transactions which leads to profit shifting, or on an analysis of declared profit rates in 
jurisdictions with different tax rates. Trade studies either look at discrepancies in reported 
trade values between importers and exporters which could reflect double-invoicing of 
transactions, or large deviations in the prices of similar goods recorded.  
 
 
Table 1: Estimates of Tax Revenue Lost by Developing Countries through 
Corporate Tax Avoidance
36
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Study Tax Revenue Lost 
Cobham (2005) $50 bn. 
Christian Aid (2008) $160 bn.(2008) 
Christian Aid (2009) $121.8 bn. (avge. 2005-7) 
Oxfam (2000) $35 bn. (1998) 
Hollingshead, (2010) $98-106 bn. (avge. 2002-2006) 
 
Critics have questioned the methods that have been used to arrive at these estimates and 
the strong assumptions on which they are based.
37
 Fuest and Riedel in their survey 
conclude that “most existing estimates of tax revenue losses in developing countries due 
to evasion and avoidance are not based on reliable methods and data”.38 However others, 
while not denying the crude nature of many estimates, argue that there is evidence that 
developing country governments are losing tax revenues as a result of corporate practices 
and that the orders of magnitude quoted are not implausible.
39
 
 
Further support for the view that corporate tax avoidance is not a trivial problem comes 
from estimates in developed countries where data and methods are more reliable. These 
also show substantial tax losses even though the tax authorities are much better resourced 
than in developing countries. Studies for the US have arrived at estimates of tax losses of 
between $10 billion and $60 billion
40
 while in the UK the Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
41
estimated losses through corporate tax avoidance of £12 bn. a year.
42
 Given the much 
greater capacity of the tax authorities in the North to monitor and control such practices 
compared to their counterparts in the South, this reinforces the impression that 
developing countries may lose substantial amounts of government revenue through tax 
evasion and avoidance. 
 
Mechanisms for Tax Avoidance 
 
There are a number of ways in which companies practice tax avoidance. These can be 
grouped into three broad categories.
43
 First, there is the manipulation of the prices of 
goods and services charged internally within the firm. Second, firms can arrange their 
corporate structure and ownership of assets in ways that reduce their tax liabilities.  
Finally, there are alternative financing arrangements which can be used to gain maximum 
tax benefit.
44
 
 
TNCs which have activities in a number of different tax jurisdictions can reduce taxes by 
pricing transactions between different affiliates in such a way that profits are declared in 
those countries where tax rates are lowest. In the USA, it has been reported that 48% of 
exports and 40% of imports involve trade between related parties.
45
 Globally it is 
estimated that a third of world trade is intra-firm.
46
 This shows that the scope for using 
transfer pricing to shift profits is considerable. The prices of exports can be inflated in 
low tax countries and artificially lowered in high tax countries, with the reverse 
happening for imports.  
 
Most of the studies of transfer pricing manipulation come from developed countries, 
particularly the US.
47
 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also been active in 
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pursuing companies which it believes have been artificially reducing their declared 
profits through such practices.
48
 Summarizing a number of recent cases Sikka and 
Willmott concluded that “transfer pricing is not just an accounting technique, but also a 
method of resource allocation and avoidance of taxes that affects distribution of income, 
wealth, risks and quality of life.”49  
 
The use of transfer pricing as a means of transferring resources out of developing 
countries was first brought to light by a study carried out in Colombia in the 1970s.
50
   
Subsequent studies in other Latin American countries, and in India, Iran and Greece 
revealed that this was by no means an isolated example.
51
 More recently a series of 
studies of firms operating in China have found extensive evidence of transfer price 
manipulation
52
 In 2011 the Argentine revenues and custom service was moved to bring 
charges against some of the world’s largest grain traders such as Cargill, ADM and 
Bunge for allegedly inflating costs in Argentina to reduce taxable profits as well as using 
subsidiaries in Uruguay and Switzerland to evade taxes in Argentina for which the 
government claims it is owed £290 million in unpaid tax and duties.
53
 One recent study of 
trade mispricing estimated that developing countries lost an average of around $100 
billion a year in tax revenue as a result between 2006 and 2010.
54
 
 
The studies of transfer pricing have focussed primarily on transactions in goods where 
there is a possibility or estimating “arm’s length” prices at which trade between unrelated 
parties would take place. It is much more difficult to detect mispricing where the 
transactions involve intellectual property or intangibles. The royalty payments made for 
the use of a particular innovation by a subsidiary may have no arm’s length transaction 
with which it can be compared. One study of the USA suggested that about a half of all 
income shifting was due to transfer pricing of intangibles.
55
 
 
While transfer pricing can involve real transactions and the tax advantage to the company 
comes from manipulating the prices charged, it is also possible to reduce tax liabilities by 
altering corporate structures and creating artificial transactions. This often involves 
creating subsidiaries in tax havens where the company simply engages in paper 
transactions. The world’s major banana transnationals, Dole, Chiquita, Del Monte and 
Fyffes have subsidiaries in a number of tax havens and low tax countries such as the 
Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Ireland, Jersey and the Isle of Man, which charge the parent 
companies for using its brands, purchasing network, distribution services, management 
expertise and legal services. As a result only a small part of the total profit on bananas is 
declared in either the producing countries in Latin America or the final destination in the 
US or UK.
56
 Another example is the iconic scallop logo of Shell which is owned by a 
subsidiary in the low tax Swiss canton of Zug. This subsidiary then charges a royalty for 
the use of the logo by other Shell companies.
57
 Another transnational company, SAB 
Miller, is alleged by Action Aid to shift substantial sums of profit from its Ghanaian 
subsidiary, Accra Breweries, through royalty payments and management fees to group 
companies in the Netherlands and Switzerland where tax rates are much lower.
58
 Action 
Aid also claims that Associated British Foods’ (ABF) subsidiary Zambian Sugar plc has 
reduced its tax liabilities in Zambia through payments of fees to ABF subsidiaries in 
Ireland and Mauritius.
59
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Parent companies can change their country of incorporation or where they nominally 
have their headquarters to take advantage of lower tax rates as a number of UK based 
companies did by switching to Dublin in 2008.
60
 In the same year Boots the Chemist 
moved its headquarters from Nottingham to the Swiss canton of Zug.
61
 Companies also 
set up holding companies in low tax countries which own subsidiaries in other higher tax 
countries. Companies can also reduce their tax obligations through a scheme known as 
“outward domestication” which involve the transfer or sale of assets within a corporate 
group.
62
 This was used by the UK parent company Diageo Plc to transfer ownership of its 
Johnny Walker brand to a Dutch subsidiary without having to pay any tax on the sale.  
Although the whiskey continued to be made in Scotland, much of the profit now goes 
abroad.
63
 
 
A third major area in which firms can reduce their tax bills is through complex financing 
arrangements. This can arise from the different treatment accorded to share capital and 
loan capital by tax authorities. Whereas share capital receives dividends from post-tax 
profits, interest is regarded as a cost and deducted from the paying company’s profits for 
tax purposes.
64
 This creates an incentive for “thin capitalisation” where a subsidiary is 
financed with a large proportion of loans rather than shares and the interest paid to 
another subsidiary in a low tax area thus reducing the total tax paid by the corporation.
65
  
An example of this practice was Exxon’s Disputada de Las Condes copper mine in Chile 
which apparently operated at a loss during the 1980s and 1990s.  It was heavily indebted 
to Exxon Financials, a Bermuda-based financial branch, to which it paid interest. As a 
result the interest payments made were subject to a Chilean tax of only 4% as opposed to 
the 35% tax that would have been applied to profit remittances.
66
 SAB Miller used a 
similar strategy of thin capitalisation in Ghana, where Accra Breweries received a 
substantial loan of more than seven times its capital from Mubex, a SAB Miller 
subsidiary in Mauritius, another tax haven.
67
  
 
The existence of the practices described above is by no means confined to developing 
countries as the recent revelations about Starbuck’s activities in the UK make clear.68  
However, the problems tend to be particularly acute for developing countries because of 
their relatively smaller tax base and limited capacity to detect and prevent such 
practices.
69
   
 
5. Should CSR address Tax Issues? 
 
It is only relatively recently that the literature on CSR has begun to address issues of tax 
strategy.
70
 However, it is likely to become an increasingly important item on the CSR 
agenda in the foreseeable future. In 2004 the director of the OECD tax policy centre 
suggested that “tax is where the environment was 10 years ago”.71 Although this 
statement now seems a little premature, it is possible to draw parallels with the 
developments that led to the wave of CSR related to environmental and labour rights’ 
issues in the 1990s, described earlier.
72
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There are clear indications of increasing concerns within civil society over corporate tax 
avoidance. It features centrally in the ‘If’ campaign coordinated by over 100 development 
charities which claims, “IF governments close tax loopholes to ensure companies pay 
their fair share of taxes in poor countries, millions of children will not have to go 
hungry”.73 Over the past decade both specialist NGOs such as the Tax Justice Network in 
the UK and Global Financial Integrity in the US, development NGOs such as Oxfam, 
Action Aid and Christian Aid and groups protesting public sector cuts such as Un-Cut in 
the UK have begun to campaign around the issue of tax avoidance by transnational 
corporations.  Particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008 led to increased fiscal 
deficits in the developed world and government adoption of austerity measures involving 
large cuts in government expenditure, the media has “named and shamed” companies 
which are seen not to be contributing their fair share of taxes
74
 the payment of which 
could forego the need for some cuts, much in the same way as they exposed violations of 
labour rights by suppliers of major retailers and brands in the past. Governments and 
international organisations have also given more attention to issues of tax avoidance, 
particularly in relation to the use of tax havens.
75
 In the UK, the Chancellor, George 
Osborne condemned “aggressive tax avoidance”,76 while Prime Minister David Cameron 
called for international action on tax avoidance in his speech at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos in January 2013.
77
 
 
A number of strands of CSR discourse suggest that tax issues could legitimately be 
included within the scope of CSR.
78
 The notion of corporate citizenship is often used in 
this context to describe the range of responsibilities a corporation has towards the society 
in which it operates. Arguably taxation is part of the “social contract” between the citizen 
and the state thus generating an obligation on the part of citizens to contribute. A claim to 
“corporate citizenship” can therefore be held to generate an obligation to pay tax in the 
jurisdiction within which the firm is operating. Yet currently while a bank such as 
Barclays refers to itself as a responsible global citizen and operates a reputation 
committee as well as a range of CSR initiatives, ‘nowhere does its policy mention 
Barclays’ tax avoidance schemes’.79 
A second argument for regarding tax as a CSR issue is the latter’s emphasis on the need 
to take into consideration the interests of stakeholders as well as the narrow interests of 
shareholders. Whereas from a shareholder perspective, taxation is a cost to be minimized 
(as too are wages), from a stakeholder perspective, taxes and wages are part of the total 
value produced and thus the state is as much a stakeholder in the enterprise as the 
employees.   
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the state could be seen as supplying services to the 
private sector, whether in the form of an educated labour force, the legal system or roads 
which the company uses to transport its goods. Taxation is then the price which a 
company pays in return for these services and since CSR includes “fair dealing with 
suppliers”,80 paying taxes is part of fair dealing with the state as a supplier. Sikka puts 
this in terms of the state providing “social capital” for the private sector, in the same way 
as shareholders provide financial capital.
81
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Perhaps one of the most common formulations of CSR is in terms of the need for a 
company to consider its Triple Bottom Line including its social and environmental as 
well as its conventional economic impacts.
82
 In this context taxation can be seen as 
contributing to the Triple Bottom Line. For some, although it is not part of the company’s 
financial return, it should be included in the economic bottom line.
83
 Others, however, 
see it mainly contributing to the social bottom line.
84
 Either way, there is a clear case for 
regarding tax payments as something more than just a cost to be minimized. 
 
The argument often put by those who defend tax avoidance (as opposed to illegal tax 
evasion) is that no company (or individual) is under any obligation to pay more than the 
minimum tax which they are legally required to pay and that it is legitimate business 
practice to arrange your affairs in such a way as to minimize tax payments within the law. 
Indeed, responsibilities to shareholders might imply that a corporation would be behaving 
irresponsibly if it paid more tax than was required of it by law. Eric Schmidt, Chairman 
of Google, when challenged about the company’s tax avoidance strategies stated bluntly: 
‘I am very proud of the structure that we set up. We did it based on the incentives that the 
governments offered us to operate. It’s called capitalism.’85CSR often emphasises “going 
beyond compliance”, however. Particularly in developing countries where laws are weak 
or standards low, mere compliance cannot be used to claim a high standard of corporate 
responsibility. Equally then, a claim to being a socially responsible company requires 
something more than avoiding illegal tax evasion while making use of all available tax 
loopholes. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that exactly the same kind of “business case” for addressing tax 
issues exists as are often put forward more generally for adopting CSR.
86
 These include:  
 
 the reputational risk that can come from negative publicity if the company is 
shown to be avoiding tax;  
 the risk of litigation and fines if tax strategies are challenged by the tax 
authorities; 
 the risk of jeopardizing relations with governments and potential negative impacts 
when bidding for government contracts; 
 uncertainty about future tax liabilities having a negative effect on shareholder 
value; 
 pre-empting the risk that tax rules will be tightened. 
 
This suggests that there are strong reasons why tax strategy should be addressed as an 
aspect of CSR. With growing public concern over tax avoidance, failure to do so could 
potentially undermine corporate legitimacy.   
 
6. CSR and Taxation in Practice 
 
Although a strong case can be made that companies espousing CSR should address tax 
issues, in practice they are rarely mentioned either in CSR reports or corporate codes of 
conduct. As the examples mentioned earlier illustrate, tax avoidance is practised by many 
leading transnational companies.
87
 Many of these companies are also regarded as leaders 
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in terms of corporate social responsibility, have ethical codes of conduct and publish CSR 
reports. Indeed, the apparent disconnect between the high sounding rhetoric of corporate 
claims of social responsibility and their everyday practices in terms of tax strategy has 
been characterized recently as “organized hypocrisy”.88 
 
Although Sikka focuses on a supposed double standard between what companies say and 
what they do in practice, in fact none of the CSR statements that he quotes from the 
companies that he analyses explicitly mention tax. Indeed, one of the most striking 
aspects of the debate about CSR and taxation is that although various organizations
89
 
have pushed for a link to be established, most firms do not make one.   
 
Previous studies of the content of codes of conduct show that these very rarely mention 
tax issues. An OECD survey of 233 codes by individual companies, industry and trade 
associations, partnerships of stakeholders and inter-governmental organizations found 
that taxation was only mentioned in one code.
90
 Similarly, a study of the codes of the 200 
largest companies in the world found that timely payment of taxes was only mentioned 
by one company.
91
 More recently, a study comparing the codes of conduct of 26 
companies headquartered in tax havens and 20 US based firms found only one firm in 
each group referring to tax payments in their codes of conduct. In both cases this was 
merely a commitment to comply with tax rules and legal obligations.
92
 
 
Even companies that are regarded as leaders in terms of CSR rarely give any attention to 
taxation as a CSR issue.  As a part of this research a survey of the CSR reports and codes 
of conduct of major TNCs regarded as CSR leaders was carried out in 2010. Of the top 
100 TNCs according to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, 35 were listed on 
FTSE4Good.  In our survey these 35 were taken as examples of leaders in terms of CSR 
and their CSR reports and their codes of conduct examined to see what they had to say 
about tax.   
 
Only in 13 cases was there any mention of tax in the CSR report and the majority simply 
refer to the fact that they make a contribution to the countries in which they operate 
through paying taxes and make no explicit mention of their corporate tax policies. Only 
four of the companies made some explicit statement related to the company’s tax policies 
– Diageo, WPP, Repsol-YPF and Telefónica.93 Diageo states that “Transactions between 
Diageo subsidiaries based in different countries are priced on an arm’s length basis as if 
the subsidiaries were unrelated companies, in accordance with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention”.94 WPP indicate that “We believe our obligation is to pay the amount of tax 
legally due in the territory in which the liability arises and to observe all applicable rules 
and regulations in all the territories in which we operate. However, at the same time we 
also have an obligation to maximise share owner value and to manage financial and 
reputational risk. This includes controlling our overall liability to taxation.”95 Repsol-
YPF claims transparency in tax payments in accordance with the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, while Telefónica explicitly states that it does not use tax havens 
in its operations. 
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Even fewer companies referred to tax issues in their codes of conduct than in their CSR 
reports – nine in total.  Most of these cases refer to the need to comply with the law and 
to pay a fair share of taxation.  However they also often mention the need to minimize 
taxation in the interest of shareholder value.  Vodafone for examples states that it “is not 
able to determine the ‘fair’ amount of tax for it to pay overall, or in any particular 
territory.  It believes its obligation is to pay the amount of tax legally due in any territory, 
in accordance with rules set by governments.  The maximisation of shareholder value will 
generally involve minimisation of taxation”.96 Similarly Unilever declares that “Our 
Code of Business Principles requires all Unilever companies to comply with the laws and 
regulations of the countries in which they operated, and this applies just as much to 
taxation as to any other issue … in order to create and preserve value, we will seek to 
minimise our tax liabilities while complying with all applicable laws.”97  
 
Some codes also refer to steps to influence government tax policies.  Thus Vodafone will 
“Where possible and appropriate (seek) to shape future tax legislation and practice in 
ways that promote the Group’s interest”.  Unilever makes a similar statement to the effect 
that “Our Code also encourages our businesses to represent their views on the 
formulation and administration of tax laws, either directly or through trade associations 
and similar bodies”.98 
 
This indicates that very few companies see their tax strategies as being in any way related 
to their CSR activities. They are happy to claim that they are making a social contribution 
through paying taxes that are legally due. However, they do not generally make any 
commitments in terms of tax avoidance and even where they do mention these issues, 
they tend to be qualified by reference to the interest of shareholders or the group. Recent 
public concern about tax avoidance may be making some companies more circumspect in 
their statements on tax policies, but the issue is still not generally seen as an aspect of 
CSR. 
 
7. What would a responsible tax strategy involve? 
 
This raises the question of what would be the key elements of corporate responsibility in 
relation to taxation. While it is not the aim here to develop a fully fledged strategy, it is 
worth identifying a few key features that would need to be included. 
  
As was seen earlier, the use of transfer pricing has been a key way in which global 
companies have reduced their tax bills. A first step, therefore, would be to commit to 
using arm’s length pricing in all transactions with related parties as recommended by the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. While it is not always easy to establish 
arm’s length prices for all transactions, there are principles laid out by the OECD in its 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
which are regularly updated.   
 
A second mechanism identified which enables companies to avoid taxes is through the 
creation of complex corporate structures and the allocation of assets within those 
structures. Here a fundamental commitment would be to avoid the artificial creation of 
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such structures that are unrelated to real business transactions and are primarily created to 
reduce the tax liabilities of the corporation. Since many of these artificial structures 
which companies use involve subsidiaries located in tax havens, a commitment along the 
lines made by Teléfonica, as mentioned above, to avoid using tax havens in their 
operations would be a further indication of a responsible tax policy. 
 
The third mechanism that was identified earlier through which companies seek to avoid 
tax is through artificial financial arrangements. Again, there should be a commitment not 
to use such arrangements in order to reduce the company’s tax burden, unless there was a 
non-tax related reason for doing so. 
 
A responsible tax strategy involves not only taking steps to ensure that the company does 
not engage in tax avoidance, but also requires a high level of transparency. This includes 
both transparency in payments that are made, as is required, for example, by the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, but could be extended to reporting on a 
country-by-country basis. 
 
Tax avoidance is not the only negative aspect of corporate behaviour that affects 
government fiscal revenues. The pressure to reduce tax rates in order to attract investment 
which governments are often subject to from multilateral development institutions, and 
the broader context of “tax competition” between countries, also undermine the ability of 
governments to obtain adequate fiscal resources. Contrary to current practices, corporate 
responsibility would involve a company agreeing not to lobby or pressure host 
governments to provide it with more favourable tax treatment. This might be consistent 
with the increasing emphasis within CSR on ‘responsible lobbying’.99 
 
There are of course limitations to the use of CSR as a means of dealing with tax 
avoidance. Many of these are similar to those which have been noted in relation to other 
aspects of CSR. First of all, where particular strategies are central for a company’s 
profitability, then it is particularly difficult to change in order to bring practice into line 
with the rhetoric. Companies which at present make extensive use of tax avoidance and 
have large numbers of subsidiaries located in tax havens may find altering their strategies 
particularly costly. As with all voluntary codes, the failure of some companies to add 
such standards creates a “free rider” problem with laggards who continue to practice tax 
avoidance gaining a competitive advantage vis-à-vis those companies which adopt more 
stringent standards. Restraint in terms of not exploiting loop-holes, even where legally it 
might be permissible to do so, would need to be exercised by leading TNCs to show the 
way and generate pressure on others to conform.  
 
The fact that public pressure puts some companies in the spotlight more than others, 
means that the application of voluntary measures tends to be uneven. Most of the 
companies whose tax avoidance strategies have attracted widespread attention have 
tended to be those supplying consumer goods and having a direct relationship with the 
public. Reliance on pressure from civil society to promote greater tax payments also 
depends on the activities of NGOs who are constrained by their limited resources and 
campaigning priorities and therefore tend to focus on a few high profile companies.
100
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This implies that a regulatory approach is required in order to ensure compliance across 
the board.   
 
8. Conclusion  
 
This paper has shown that tax avoidance by transnational corporations is a major global 
issue, particularly for developing countries where the tax base is relatively weak and the 
capacity of the state to effectively control such practices is very limited. The fiscal crisis 
of both developed and developing countries has put tax avoidance more firmly on the 
agenda than ever before. 
 
Although leading companies claim to be socially responsible, the focus of their CSR 
efforts up to now has been on environmental, labour and human rights issues and taxation 
has rarely featured. Indeed, many TNCs see no contradiction in espousing CSR while at 
the same time seeking to minimize their tax liabilities, often through aggressive tax 
avoidance. They are facilitated in doing so by the absence of tax issues from the CSR 
agenda. 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the climate of opinion is changing and civil 
society organizations are putting increasing pressure on companies over their tax 
contributions. It is likely therefore that taxation will come to be seen increasingly as an 
issue which companies need to address as part of their CSR. In addition to the external 
pressure that companies will face, there are a number of reasons why logically, CSR 
should include commitments on tax. We have proposed some key elements of a 
responsible tax strategy. 
 
We do not believe that the inclusion of commitments on tax will remove the problem of 
tax avoidance any more than environmental or labour rights’ issues can be dealt with 
solely by voluntary corporate commitments. Measures to strengthen the capacity of the 
state in developing countries and international action, for example to restrict the use of 
tax havens, will also be necessary. Greater cooperation between national tax authorities 
and requirements by home countries for greater transparency in reporting by TNCs is also 
needed. However, companies that claim a high level of social responsibility should not 
stand by and wait for governments and international organizations to take a lead, but 
should lead the way in terms of country-by-country reporting and abandoning transfer 
price manipulation and the use of tax havens. Failure to do so could in the future 
undermine their legitimacy in the same way that abuse of workers or environmental 
disasters has affected companies in the past. 
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